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Navigating a 
Legal Minefield
INVESTIGATIONS, ANALYSIS & STRATEGY
Directors & Officers 
Fiduciary & Best 
Interest Duties
Is Best Interest a 
Fiduciary Duty?
Much is made in the media 
and in political circles of the 
adjective “fiduciary” and the 
aphorism “best interest”. 
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• A creature of the general 
law imposed by equity & 
public policy
• Not a choice, but…
• its application usurped by 
intrusion of statutory best 
interest duties...and 
contract
• Fiduciary duty is 
prohibitive, negative 
duties…
• but is it? – different & 
evolving interpretations 
including positive duties in 
some cases
• Conflicts require ‘Informed 
Consent’…
Common Heritage But Different Meanings –Fiduciaries
• But actions to obtain may 
be positive and fiduciary 
but not unanimous opinion
• Other positive actions may 
be fiduciary
• Fiduciaries are status based 
but fiduciary status 
depends on role as well
• A person subject to 
fiduciary obligations is a 
fiduciary, whether or not 
status defined
• Exercised concurrently with 
best interest & other duties
• Enlivens remedies in equity
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• General law meaning is to 
act positively in objective 
interest of beneficiary –
essentially fiduciary…
• …but now best interest 
duties are largely creatures 
of statute with…
• bespoke multi-layered ever-
changing statutory 
interventions
• Best interest duties rely on 
prioritisation of interests, 
not prohibition
• Best interest, best financial 
interest, best long-term 
financial interest, interest 
and benefit are not the 
same but are often used 
interchangeably
Common Heritage But Different Meanings –Best Interest
• One person’s best interest 
may not be the same as 
another persons
• Best interest interpretations 
vary with context
• Intrusion of statute 
continues (Your Super, 
Your Future 2021)
• Application often but not 
always duty of a fiduciary
• Uncertain application in 
investment strategy 
formulation & due diligence




Lack of Economic Loyalty
•Ignorance & ignoring of fiduciary duty






















Assumptions of Fiduciary 
Relationship Unrealised
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Systemic & Cyclical Failure in 
Australian Financial Products & 
Services
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Table 3.25 Legal matters raised in the judgments Variable
Recurrence % of 
sample Correlation
Top decile
Related party transactions CA s 191 1 22.16%
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, 
AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 2 20.70% 93.42%
Top quartile
Dishonesty 1 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23% 95.31%
Systemic causes - first variable correlation
Dishonesty 1 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23% 95.31%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180-184, SISA s 62 3 15.23% 95.31%
Disclosure 4 14.86% 92.97%
Systemic causes - second variable correlation
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180–184, SISA s 62 3 15.23% 100.00%
Chanticleer is Australia's pre– eminent business column
Kenneth Hayne Must Traverse a Legal Quagmire 
Dr David G Millhouse 2021©www.millhouse.co
‘A stunning finding … 
ought to be brought to 
the attention of  
Hayne’
(Tony Boyd AFR Jan 16 2019)
• Have damaged the Wallis 
tenets of Disclosure, Advice, 
& Literacy
• Provided for prioritisation of 
interests over prohibitions
• Led to a disclosure regime 
requiring huge 
incomprehensible documents 
– data is not knowledge
Statutory Interventions
• Promotes ‘box-ticking’ 
compliance over proper 
outcomes
• Created a large costly 
compliance industry
• Reduced fiduciary law to 
‘legal Polyfilla’ (eg
unregistered MIS)
• Corporations Act 2001 ss 
180,181 (Good faith –
objective), s 180(2)(d) 
(rational belief – subjective), 
ss 601FC,FD (MIS), ss 
961A,B (advice), ss 766E 
(custody), Ch 8B (MIS 
priority, Depositary as 
fiduciary), s 910A (adviser 
standard), s 964 (custody), s 
921U (advice), s 994 (DDO)
• Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 –
(Choice, MySuper Default, 
SMSF) – ss 52(2),(6),(8) 
(trustee and director of 
trustee personal liability), s 
29VN (beneficiary 
MySuper), s 10 (custody)
Statutory Contexts
• Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Act 2009 s 
382 (now amended) – belief 
– subjective
• National Consumer 
Protection & Credit Act 2009 
s 158 (mortgage broker best 
interest)
• Evolving interpretations of 
‘retail’ investor – FASEA & 
Design and Distribution 
Obligations
• Eleven different contextual 
interpretations + six FASEA 
interpretations + 2021 Your 
Super, Your Future ‘Best 
Financial Interest’ 
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• ‘Mad, Bad, and Dangerous 
to know’
Legal Objections to 
Best Interest in 
Statutes
• Superlative ‘best’ has no 
objective legal meaning
• Is not the same as best 
outcome
• Can be interpreted literally
• Is a trustee indemnity in 
best interest?
• Is the charging of fees in 
best interest?




• Different jurisdictions use the 
same terminology but apply it 
differently
• Usually more onerous
• Australian directors of 
companies operating 
internationally or Australian 
directors of overseas 
companies in Australia take 
note
• United States & Canada –
proscriptive and prescriptive 
(positive) fiduciary and 
separate best interest duties –
States and Provinces can 
apply law differently –
ambiguous – some (US) 
require ‘absolute punctilio of 
honour’ but no uniform 
fiduciary standard – Canada 
Client Relationship Model 
combines all duties – strict 
liability – no ‘Safe Harbour’ in 
financial advice – ‘teachable 
moments’
Jurisdictional Contexts
• United Kingdom Companies 
Act 2006 – Director’s duties 
defined as fiduciary & 
codified – use language of 
and rely for remedies in the 
general law – s 172 ‘promote 
the success of the company’ –
very broad drafting – pro–& 
prescriptive – corporate 
opportunities liabilities
• Germany, EU & civil law 
countries – Fiduciary duty a 
creature of contract – duties 
vest in the duty of skill and 
care – but are fiduciary like –
Untreue doctrine –
proscriptive and prescriptive –
culpa in contrahendo doctrine 
– clients must understand 
what they are doing – cannot 
be contracted away – German 
civil law written into EU 
statutes – subjective & 
objective tests – spirit & letter 
of the law compliance
• Singapore – strict proscriptive 
tradition relying on disclosure 
to avoid breach in the first 
place – strict liability– mainly 
statute and contract based, 
can refer to UK & Australian 
law – cultural overlays
International Trends 
in Fiduciary Law
Australian fiduciary law is an
internationaloutlier– scholarlycalls for
reform
• United Nations Fiduciary Duty in
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• Wingecarribee Shire Council 
v Lehman Brothers Australia 
[2012] (existed)
• ABN Amro Bank NV v 
Bathurst Regional Council 
[2014] (existed)
Fiduciary Duty Case 
Law
• Westpac v Bell Group [2012] 
(positive duties may exist)




• Hospital Products v United 
States Surgical Corp [1984] 
(difference between US and 
Australian fiduciary law)
• Babcock & Brown Global 
DIF 111 Global Investment 
Fund LP v Babcock & 
Brown International Pty Ltd 
[2017] (difference between 
US & Australian fiduciary 
law – defines ‘promoter’ as 
a fiduciary – positive duties)
• Rouse v IOOF [1999] 
(undivided loyalty)
• APRA v Kelaher [2019] ‘IOOF’ (best outcome, risks, action not 
process, res ipsa loquitur denied)
• ASIC v Mitchell [2020] ‘Tennis Australia’ (interests of the company, 
possible conflicts of interest, s 180)
• ASIC v Australian Property Custodians Holdings Limited [2013] 
‘Prime Trust’ (uncertain boundaries)
• Lewski v ASIC [2017] ‘Prime Trust’ (Tunnelling – lawful 
expropriation)
• ASIC v NSG Services, Golden Financial Group [2017] (CA s 961)
• Pioneer Concrete Services [1986] (interests v best interests)
Best Interest Duty Case Law
• FASEA (now abolished) but standards remain CA s 921U – unlimited 
personal liability (tenor & quantum) – Caveat Venditor
• Six additional best interest duties – broad effects long term, 
conflicts, likely circumstances, appropriateness, comprehension & 
competence, value for money – FASEA fiduciary-like – does not use 
adjective or noun
• Corporations Act s 961A,B – Safe Harbour defence
• Statutes usurp & subsume general law fiduciary obligation…
except in pre-contract advice and/or in advisory contract
• Broadening of adviser to ‘Relevant Provider’ – (stockbroker, 
accountant, mortgage broker, sales reps, financial advisers, wealth 
managers)
• Broadening of interpretation of ‘retail’ investor – comprehension 
standards
• Supplemented by Design & Distribution Obligations & Product 
Intervention Powers Act (2020) – adds additional best interest 
liability CA pt 7.A s 994, 1023 – requires target market 
determination, market conduct ++ by Regulated Persons – broadens 
retail investor to financial consumer – contracts void ab initio – all 
financial products regulated by CA, AA, NCCPA apples to issuers, 
distributors, sellers & advisers
• Mortgage Broker best interest duty NCCPA s 158LA,LE ASIC RG 
0000 (2020) – No Safe Harbour – No contracting out
Best Interest & Fiduciary Duties In Financial Advice
• SIS Act 1993 & Your Future, Your Super Bill (2021)
• Best financial interest of beneficiaries test proposed – does not replace 
other best interest tests – meant to clarify
• Adds to best interest interpretation for Choice & MySuper Default Funds 
(best long-term financial interest)
• Non-financial beneficiary interests cannot be at expense of financial 
interest
• Strikes at ‘trustee directed products’ – impacts on vertical integration
• Annual  beneficiary outcome tests – long term investment performance –
failure means failure of financial best interest test
• Restrict use of funds by trustee without ‘robust quantitative analysis’ – no 
materiality threshold 
• Statutory (2021) financial interest is not: non-financial benefits, 
counselling, some third-party payments & payments to intermediaries, 
discretionary payments
• Reversal of onus of proof
• Strict liability with large civil liability
• Trustee duties apply to directors personally including SMSF trustee 
directors – no corporate veil
• Legislation refers to financial interest, interest, & fiduciary duty of trustee
• Applies to SMSF trustees but different penalties
• Statutes do not replace general law fiduciary obligation & liability 
remains if statutory remedies fail
Best Interest & Fiduciary Duties in Superannuation 
Entity Trustees
• Traditional distinction between confidence/confidential information 
in equity and intellectual assets as property
• Becoming blurred – confidential information, trade secrets is 
intellectual property (Stephen John Coogan v News Group 
Newspapers Limited [2012] EWCA 
• Digital economy will result in more conflict over ownership & usage 
rights… but these Intangible Assets are the key to success in a 
digital economy
• Best interest & fiduciary obligations arise in multiple situations
Best Interest & Fiduciary Duties in Confidential 
Information
• Given uncertainty of application 
of fiduciary law, impose 
fiduciary obligations in 
contracts
• Broaden the scope of 
contractual fiduciary duties – eg
control, discretion, autonomy, 
client facing, supplier facing, 
related parties, conflicts of 
interest, hiring delegations, 
specific skills
Best Interest & Fiduciary Duties in Employment
• Employment and director and 
fiduciary duties are different 
and limited (in employment)
• Conflicts of interest register for 
senior employees
• Class action financing now a Managed Investment Scheme with a 
licensed corporate trustee (Responsible Entity)
• RE directors have fiduciary duty to trustee company
• Trustee company has best interest duty to members of the MIS
• MIS promoters are fiduciaries in general law (Babcock & Brown DIF 
111 Global Investment Fund LP v Babcock & Brown International 
Pty Ltd 2017)
• Promoters can be – the RE, financier, or law firm advising… but 
lawyers have established fiduciary and best interest duties to    
clients
• Many sources of conflicts of interest affect financial outcomes of 
class action beneficiaries & company defendants 
• Major law reform expected in 2021 (Paterson Inquiry) – uses best 
interest, interests, fiduciary & fiduciary-like throughout report
• DDO overlay may apply
Best Interest & Fiduciary Duties in Shareholder Class 
Actions
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• Define the context
• Define the jurisdictions, 
especially cross-border
• Define related parties
• Identify conflicts of interest
• Define who is a fiduciary
• Analyse the existence of 
fiduciary obligation
• Define who and which 
entity owes a best interest 
duty
• Analyse the application of 
statutory best interest 
duties
Strategies for Counsel –How to Untangle the Gordian Knot
• Define to whom duties are 
owed
• Analyse director personal 
best interest liability in 
superannuation trustee 
entities
• Review organisational and 
governance practices to fully 
document liabilities (and 
opportunities)
• Be clear whether you are 
defending, prosecuting, 
divesting, acquiring, or 
investing
• Spend time on strategy 
development at board level
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• The Australian Government is in receipt of four landmark reports: the 
Heydon Royal Commission, Productivity Commission (superannuation 
and financial sector competition), and the Hayne Royal Commission.
• Each of them points to deep systemic and cyclical problems in the 
provision of financial products and financial services.  
• A common thread is poor culture leading to poor conduct, diffusion of 
poor culture (taint), the distinction between compliance-based law and 
morality (what can be done is not what should be done), and re-
establishment of trust.
Government: Does it Listen to Advice?
• Haynes’ required reform is buried in pp 494-496 of Volume 1. 
This is the need to simplify the law and implement its intent 
• Hayne notes: ‘because the law is now spread over so many 
different Acts and is as complex as it is … the very size of the 
task shows why it must be tackled’
• Jeremy Cooper - Stronger Super Review : ‘directors should not 
have to collate their duties from multiple sources’
• The Productivity Commission propose a new ‘duty of care and 
a 21st century disclosure regime “based on trust”’
The Future of Law Reform
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• Hayne wants an ‘integrated solution’ linking law and morality, 
noting that ‘Regulatory gaming occurs when gaps open, an 
inevitable consequence of piecemeal change’
• This is Hayne’s real message 
• What we presently have due to time and political constraints is 
more piecemeal tactical change, in a torrent of new legislation
Hayne’s Real Message
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• Corporate Governance in Non-Bank Financial Entities 2019 
(LexisNexis)
• W[h]ither Australia? Will Parliament Act? (2020) 14(2) Law & 
Financial Markets Review
• Empirical Analysis supports the Hayne long run reform thesis (2019) 
13(2-3) Law & Financial Markets Review
• From Campbell to Hayne: W[h]ither Australia?  Australian Financial 
regulation and supervision at a cross– roads (2019) 13 (2-3) Law & 
Financial Markets Review
• Directors & Officers – Strategic Leadership or Bondage? (2020) 
Enterprise Governance eJournal Bond University Faculty of Law
• Best Interest Duties of Financial Advisers – More Law, More 
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